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This special issue appears at a time of confluence of two prominent trends in economics research: the 
increased embrace of controlled experiments with human subjects, and the rapid development within East 
Asian academia of western research practices.  This latter trend is particularly profound in China with 
unprecedented public investment in top mainland universities. One such investment is the 985 program, 
whose mission is transform the top tier of mainland Chinese universities to levels comparable to the top 
universities of the West. One of the many achievements of the 985 program has been the establishment of 
the Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE) at Xiamen University. WISE has taken the 
initiative in promoting experimental economics as a field in China. WISE has also established the Finance 
and Economic Experimental Laboratory (FEEL) in 2010, with the goal of having an impact on the field of 
Experimental Economics at the international level.  
This impact is most readily seen in the annual International Workshop on Experimental Economics and 
Finance that is held at Xiamen University. This special issue includes seven papers from the third annual 
installment of this workshop, which was held on December 15-16, 2012. The papers are organized into 
three subgroups. The first two papers investigate learning in games using modern approaches, the next 
three papers introduce or break new ground in the application of innovative methodologies for conducting 
experiments, and the final two papers investigate behavioral models of voting using experimental 
approaches.  
One of the more prominent lessons from experimental economics is that in one-shot strategic situations, 
Nash equilibrium is seldom played. However, in many games, repetition leads to play that increasing 
approximates, and often completely converges to, a Nash equilibrium of the stage game. Observation of 
this pattern has given rise to an extensive literature trying to identify what this learning process is, and 
how it depends upon the exact game being played and on the nature of player interactions. Feltovich and 
Oda, in the first paper of this issue, “The effect of matching mechanism on learning in games played 
under limited information,” study learning in coordination games. They consider a situation of incomplete 
information, where each player is given initial information about all players’ payoff functions. When they 
play, each player can observe his own payoff and the joint action profile. In this type of repeated 
environment, it seems intuitive that the learning process could depend on whether a fixed group 
repeatedly plays a game or whether players are randomly matched in each round from among a larger 
population. Indeed, in this study the matching protocol has a significant impact on which Nash 
equilibrium is reached in the coordination game and on the rate of convergence. One of the more 
significant findings is that play in coordination games converges more rapidly to a Nash Equilibrium with 
fixed pairs. Another finding is that fixed pairs are also more likely to converge to a more socially efficient 
Nash equilibrium. These two results together indicate that in this setting, fixed pair matching is more 
likely to generate socially desirable outcomes, but with the caveat that the play of an inefficient 
equilibrium can become more ingrained with pairs as well.  
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One of the fundamental models of industrial organization is Bertrand competition, in which firms offer a 
homogenous product, produced with identical linear costs, and compete on price. The pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium calls for all firms to price at marginal cost, resulting in zero profit for each firm. However, 
this equilibrium is dubious as a predictor of actual play, because a firm can raise its price without losing 
any profit, while enjoying a chance to increase profit if the other firms raise their prices as well. 
Experimental and empirical studies robustly find deviations from equilibrium, with prices showing 
significant dispersion. In the second paper of this Issue, “Explaining price dispersion and dynamics in 
laboratory Bertrand markets,” Bayer, Wu, and Chan introduce a new class of learning models with the 
following features. Players form beliefs about an opponent’s action choice using a weighted fictitious 
play process. They use these beliefs to calculate expected payoffs for their own actions, and then choose 
their actions probabilistically according to a logit choice rule. An interesting aspect of this model is that it 
is a generalization of Quantal Response Equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995). Bayer, Wu, and Chan 
show that their generalization captures the pricing dynamics well and is thus an appropriate model when 
there is complete information. 
In recent years, there has been increasing interest in documenting the biological correlates (such a gender, 
neurological activity, hormone levels, etc…) of individual decisions, particularly those over risky 
prospects. Nguyen and Noussair introduce the novel methodology of identifying emotional states and 
responses using face imagery analysis. They analyze the correlation between emotions and risk aversion. 
In the third paper of this issue, “Risk aversion and emotions,” the facial expressions of subjects over the 
course of an individual choice experiment, encompassing pair-wise lottery choices, are monitored and 
analyzed with face reading software. There is extensive work on the relationship between mood/emotions 
and the degree of risk aversion, but clearly no consensus. Nguyen and Noussair, through their use of the 
face reader technology, provide some evidence for these debates. With respect to emotional valence, they 
find a more positive emotional state correlates positively with tolerance for risk. With respect to specific 
emotions, they observe that the strength of emotions such as fear, anger, surprise, and happiness are all 
negatively correlated with risk tolerance. This study is a proof of concept that face reading can be a 
valuable tool for experimental economists.  
Economists have long understood that cooperation is more likely to occur when individuals interact 
repeatedly rather than only once. However, two key components in theoretical models exhibiting this 
characteristic is notion that future payoffs are discounted and the number of repetitions is infinite. 
Experimental economists have recently made efforts to provide truer tests of such models by adopting a 
method of creating indefinitely repeated play. Indefinitely repeated play is created when at the end of 
each round of play, and random event like a die roll determines whether or not there is a subsequent round 
of play. Under appropriate assumptions about the separability of the utility of payoffs across rounds of 
play, the risk neutrality of participants, and the manner in which subjective beliefs are formed regarding 
the “dice rolls,” then this structure is comparable to an infinitely repeated game where the discount rate is 
constant. Tan and Wei use this methodology to study, for the first time, play in indefinitely repeated 
voluntary contribution games (VCM), a well-known social dilemma, in their paper “Voluntary 
contribution mechanism played over an infinite horizon”. In their experiment, they find some remarkable 
differences between the often-studied finitely repeated VCM and the indefinitely repeated version. 
Specifically, under indefinite repetition, there is no decay of average contribution levels, and there is an 
absence of the restart effect; Under finite repetition, new repeated games tend to start at high contribution 
levels even after players have previously experienced decay in a previous repeated game. Moreover, Tan 
and Wei are able to identify a new interesting player type. There is often a leader who strives to establish 
cooperation, and then defects in an attempt to profit from others high level of contributions. This type of 
behavior was not identifiable in previous studies on indefinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemmas, a simpler 
social dilemma, because of the coarser action sets in the prisoner’s dilemma.  
Since Holt and Laury’s (2002) seminal experimental study on measuring risk aversion, there has been an 
explosion in the number of studies that use a choice menu (also known as a price list) protocol to measure 
individuals’ preference parameters. The choice menu is a series of decision tasks between two 
alternatives, arrayed in such a way so that a given value of a preference parameter implies a unique 
switching point from one column to the other. The point of switching serves as a statistic for the 
individual’s preference parameter. Breaban et al., in their paper “When do structured products become too 
good to be true? An experiment”, investigate the use of such menus in the applied problem faced by 
individual investors choosing structured financial products. They show that using menus with increasing 
percentages of a guaranteed return results in a too-good-to-be-true choice anomaly. When the guaranteed 
returns exceed a certain point then subjects increasingly make stochastically dominated choices. 
However, when the items in the menu are randomly ordered, the anomaly does not appear. Furthermore, 
when the probabilities governing returns are more transparently presented, the anomaly also does not 
appear. This is an interesting study that documents the possibility of real problems in the implementation 
of a choice menu for financial decisions.   
In political science, requiring supermajorities to enact important laws is recognized as important to 
protect minorities from the tyranny of the majority. In the sixth paper in this special issue, “Risk aversion, 
overconfidence, and private information as determinants of majority thresholds”, Attanasi et al. consider 
the relationship between the majority threshold an individual prefers on the one hand, and her risk 
aversion level and her beliefs about whether she is in agreement with the majority opinion on the other. 
The experiment Attanasi et al. report has two treatments, which vary how much information is available 
about other voters’ preferences. In the Info treatment, players observe a private signal about the 
distribution of outcome preferences, whereas under the NoInfo treatment, they do not observe the signal. 
There are two phases in each round of play. The first consists of a risk aversion measurement protocol. 
The second consists of choosing a preferred threshold and then measurement of beliefs about other 
players’ preferences. The results show that in the Noinfo treatment, preferred majority thresholds are 
positively correlated with risk aversion and negatively correlated with overconfidence. In the Info 
treatment, a favorable signal about whether one is in the majority reduces the threshold demanded. 
Information reduces overconfidence in beliefs. This paper provides a microeconomic foundation for 
preferences for supermajorities, the fear of the tyranny of the majority, which ultimately has risk aversion 
and pessimistic beliefs at its core. 
The paper by Kuo and Wang, entitled “The use of strategy methods in experimental pivotal voting game”, 
considers a basic question in political science: why some people bother to vote and others do not. They 
revisit Levine and Palfrey’s (2007) test of the model of Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) in which voters 
have heterogeneous costs of voting. Kuo and Wang use the strategy method, which can directly elicit 
cutoff strategies, which take the form of cost thresholds below which an individual chooses to vote and 
above which she does not. They replicate Palfrey and Rosenthal’s findings that a majority of individuals 
exhibit underdog and competition effects. The underdog effect refers to higher rate of turnout among 
members of a minority faction than among the majority. The competition effect is the presence of higher 
turnout in a close election compared to one that is not close. Unlike Levine and Palfrey, however, Kuo 
and Wang, also find greater than Nash equilibrium levels of turnout. This paper is a good example of how 
the strategy method produces results that are typically congruent with those under direct response, but 
also how there are occasional differences that arise under the two elicitation methods. 
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